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Abstract 
This paper analyses the importance of real wage rigidities, in particular through their interaction 
with price stickiness, for optimal monetary policy in a calibrated small open economy DSGE 
model including oil in production and consumption. Blanchard and Galí (2007a) show real rigidi-
ties to introduce a trade-off between stabilising inflation and the welfare-relevant output gap. The 
present paper complements their findings by showing that the welfare cost of real rigidities can be 
substantial compared to nominal frictions. In a typical “tale of the second best”, we also show that 
in the presence of real wage rigidities, price stickiness can be welfare-enhancing.  
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1. Introduction 
After having been largely ignored by monetary economists for most of the past decade, the im-
portance of real rigidities for monetary policy has received fresh impetus with a recent paper by 
Blanchard and Galí (2007a) showing that such rigidities introduce a trade-off between stabilising 
inflation or the welfare-relevant output gap. The welfare consequences of this monetary policy 
dilemma have not been explored, however. One interesting question in this regard is whether the 
magnitude of real rigidities that is likely to be encountered in practice entails significant welfare 
losses, compared with those from typical degrees of price stickiness. Also, the potential impor-
tance of real rigidities for monetary policy raises the question of whether and how they interact 
with nominal frictions.             
 This paper addresses these issues through a new-Keynesian small open economy model 
incorporating one major type of real rigidity, namely real wage rigidity (as in Blanchard and Galí 
2007a), in the presence of one particular type of cost-push shock, namely an oil price shock. Real 
and nominal rigidity parameters are calibrated within the range of values found in recent empiri-
cal analyses for euro area countries and the US. The focus on oil price shocks as the exogenous 
disturbance has particular empirical appeal because such shocks are relatively frequent, can be 
large and are easy to observe – which reduces the need for policy makers to consider proxy 
measures such as the output gap for shock identification. Incidentally, in another recent paper, 
Blanchard and Galí (2007b) find that lower real wage rigidity has been a major factor behind the 
benign macroeconomic effects of the oil price shocks of the 2000s, compared with those of the 
1970s. 
Oil price disturbances have direct effects on both supply and demand in our framework. 
On the supply side, higher oil prices raise production costs. On the demand side, they reduce real 
wages and household wealth. Lower purchasing power together with real wage persistence push 
nominal wage claims up and feed back into higher production costs. At the same time, consump-
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tion declines, although households are assumed to partly substitute non-oil for oil goods. As a 
result, the central bank is faced with both a decline in aggregate demand and higher inflation.  
 We assume the central bank to implement the optimal Ramsey solution, i.e. the optimal 
commitment strategy for given exogenous shock and economic features. The optimal commit-
ment achieves the best possible stabilisation result and constitutes the policy loss frontier. This 
assumption also allows a clearer focus on the interaction between rigidities in defining the wel-
fare frontier. Indeed, under the alternative policy framework of simple interest rate rules, the pol-
icy rule itself might affect the interaction between nominal and real rigidities. 
 The paper presents impulse responses to persistent oil price shocks and examines the wel-
fare consequences of rigidities for a small open economy that is price-taker in both oil and non-oil 
goods markets.  The main findings are two-fold. First, under oil price shocks, real wage rigidities 
imply substantial welfare losses, much larger in fact than those from nominal rigidities. Second, 
for a given degree of real wage rigidity, welfare losses decrease in the degree of nominal rigidity. 
Nominal frictions dampen the initial inflation and wage reactions to exogenous shocks and the 
magnitude of second round effects. This suggests that price rigidity may be second best under real 
wage inertia. By contrast, reducing real wage inertia is always welfare-enhancing regardless of 
the degree of price stickiness. 
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the new-Keynesian 
open economy framework. Section 3 briefly sketches the notion of optimal Ramsey policy. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the scenarios to simulate and the parameter calibration. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the numerical results. Section 6 summarises the main findings and concludes.             
2. The open economy model          
The open economy model with oil as production input and consumption good borrows from pre-
vious contributions. The open economy framework builds on Galí and Monacelli (2005), the in-
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clusion of oil is a simplified version of De Fiore et al. (2006), and the introduction of real wage 
persistence adopts the shortcut used by Blanchard and Galí (2007a), Christoffel and Linzert 
(2005) and Faia (2007). Our model combines a small open economy block with a simple repre-
sentation for the rest of the world. Consumers are forward-looking and not subject to liquidity 
constraints. In order to focus discussion, the model abstracts from fiscal policy in the form of both 
government expenditure and taxation.   
2.1 The small open economy 
2.1.1 Household sector 
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility over an infinite planning horizon. Overall 
household welfare is the expected discounted value of the stream of period utility 

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For simplicity we assume log consumption utility, which implies a unit intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. The parameter κ quantifies the relative weight of leisure in the utility function, while 
φ-1 and β are the labour supply elasticity and the discount factor, respectively. The representative 
households is subject to the period budget constraint 
11,,  ttttttCttt DQECPDNW ,                                                   (3) 
where Wt is the nominal wage and Dt is the nominal revenue from the asset portfolio, including 
shares in firms. On the right-hand side, PC,t is the consumer price index (CPI), Ct is real consump-
tion, Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-period ahead nominal pay-offs, and Dt+1 nomi-
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nal pay-offs one period ahead. Households have access to a complete set of contingent claims, 
which is internationally traded 
 The household maximizes welfare (1) under the constraint (3), which provides the first-
order condition for the optimal inter-temporal consumption 
,                (4) 
where 1,/11  tttt QEi  is the gross return on a riskless one-period bond that pays off one unit of 
domestic currency one period ahead. Consequently, EtQt,t+1 is the price of this bond.  
 The first-order condition for the optimal intra-temporal consumption-leisure choice is 
.                  (5) 
Due to persistence, actual real wages can however deviate from the optimal wage level in (5). 
Following Blanchard and Galí (2007a), Christoffel and Linzert (2005) and Faia (2007), we repre-
sent actual real wages as a weighted average of previous and optimal real wages 
,               (6) 
where 0≤ρw≤1 indicates the degree of real persistence. Real wage persistence also introduces iner-
tia in marginal production costs.
1
 
                                                     
1
 This introduction of real rigidity is a simplifying shortcut. It ignores that with real persistence wage set-
ting may become a dynamic optimisation problem similar to the pricing decision of firms. However, Bo-
dard et al. (2006) show that a search model of unemployment with staggered wage setting can provide a 
microfoundation of this simple representation of real wage inertia. Alternatively, equation (6) could also 
summarize some form of partial wage indexation (see Campolmi 2006). A real wage mark-up ν could be 
introduced in equation (5) to yield 
tttCt CNPW
,/
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 The household consumes a bundle of manufactured goods, M, and imported oil, O. Both 
components enter a CES consumption utility function 
.               (7) 
The parameters γ and ε respectively quantify the steady-state share of oil in consumption and the 
substitution elasticity between oil and manufactured goods.  
 In a second stage, the household allocates its expenditure for manufactured goods on do-
mestic production, MH, and imported goods, MF. Unit elasticity of substitution between domestic 
and imported manufactured goods is assumed for simplicity, which gives the Cobb-Douglass type 
utility function 
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where the parameter 0≤α≤1 quantifies the equilibrium non-oil import share.  
 Maximising the consumption utility (7) and (8) for given prices of oil, PO, non-oil con-
sumer goods, PM, domestic non-oil goods, PH, and non-oil imports, PF, gives the demand func-
tions 
                (9) 
               (10) 
                     (11) 
                                                                                                                                                              
For a more elaborate wage-setting model, where some households reset wages in a purely forward-looking 
manner while others index them to inflation in order to preserve real wage levels, see Rabanal (2001).      
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.              (12) 
Inserting the equations (9) and (10) in (7) as well as (11) and (12) in (8) provides the CPI 
              (13)  
and the non-oil consumer goods price index 

tFtHtM PPP ,
1
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
,               (14) 
which is the core price index in our model. The impact of import prices on the domestic CPI in-
creases with the equilibrium shares of oil and non-oil imports. 
2.1.2 Aggregate demand 
Real output in the small country, i.e. its real GDP, is the sum of the internal demand for domestic 
goods, MH, and export demand, MH
*
. As we neglect government expenditure and capital goods, 
real output equals 
.               (15) 
The demand functions (11) and (30) determine MH and MH
*
. Consequently, domestic output de-
pends on the relative price of oil, determining the oil and non-oil shares in consumption, and the 
price of domestic relative to imported non-oil consumer goods. Demand for non-oil goods in-
creases in the relative price of oil, while the strength of this substitution effect depends on the 
elasticity of substitution between oil and manufactured goods. 
2.1.3 Aggregate supply 
The model adopts a simple framework of the representative firm and aggregate supply. Each firm 
produces output with labour, N, and oil, O, as factor inputs and according to a CES production 
function  
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with 0≤θ≤1 as the steady-state input share of oil and  as the elasticity of substitution between the 
two inputs. Technology is identical across all firms and exogenously given. For notational sim-
plicity total factor productivity At can be set to one.
2
  
 Firms produce non-oil goods under monopolistic competition. Domestic output consists 
of differentiated varieties, each one produced by a single firm. The range of differentiated prod-
ucts has a mass of one. The demand for variety h equals 
               (17) 
and depends on its relative price. The higher the elasticity of substitution between varieties in 
consumption, μ, the stronger the demand reaction to changes in the relative price of h.  
 Combining equations (16) and (17) together with the fact that in equilibrium all firms 
choose the same optimal input combination yields the aggregate production function 
 
111111
0 ,
,
1




























 tt
tH
th
t ONdh
P
P
Y                (18) 
that relates output to factor demand. The price dispersion term on the left side of (18) accounts for 
the distortionary impact of price dispersion on consumption decisions and output. 
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 Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006), De Fiore et al. (2006), Leduc and Sill (2006) 
and Roeger (2005) use production functions with three inputs - labour, capital and energy - and assume 
either Cobb-Douglass or CES functional forms. The Cobb-Douglass function assumes a unit elasticity of 
substitution between factor inputs.  
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 The optimising firm chooses the cost-minimising factor mix, which depends on relative 
factor prices and relative factor productivity. Minimising the production costs WtNh,t+PO,tOh,t  un-
der (16) yields 
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as the optimal factor mix of domestic producers for given relative input prices and  
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as the cost minimising production at firm level in the absence of adjustment costs. Under constant 
returns to scale, identical production technology and cost minimisation, real marginal production 
costs in the domestic economy, MCt, finally amount to   
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Empirical research (e.g. Altissimo et al. 2006, Bils and Klenow 2004, Taylor 1998) provides am-
ple evidence for price persistence in goods markets. Producers reset prices infrequently. Potential 
explanations for sluggish adjustment are resetting and information collection costs and contrac-
tual obligations.
3
 Following Calvo (1983), firms are assumed to set prices in staggered contracts 
of random duration. In any period, each firm gets to announce a new price with probability 1-ξ, 
while the previous price remains valid otherwise. 
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 Altissimo et al. (2006) and Taylor (1999) also discuss the empirical evidence with regard to various can-
didate explanations for price persistence.  
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 Given the infrequent adjustment, price setting becomes a problem of dynamic optimiza-
tion. Firms choose the target price thP ,
~
such as to maximise the present value of profits over the 
expected contract duration 
,              (22) 
where λt+1 is the marginal utility of nominal wealth. The firm’s first order condition from maxi-
mising (22) subject to the demand function (17) equals 
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The first fraction on the left hand side quantifies the price mark-up under monopolistic competi-
tion, which implies an inefficiently low level of production. The mark-up size inversely varies 
with the elasticity of substitution between product varieties and is thus a positive function of the 
firm’s market power.4            
 Given the law of large numbers, the probability of price correction at firm level, 1-ξ, also 
characterises aggregate price setting. In a given period, the share 1-ξ of domestic producers resets 
prices, whereas δ percent of the firms do not adjust. Consequently, the probability ξ is also a 
measure of aggregate price rigidity. 
 Domestic GDP prices evolve according to the dynamic equation 
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 Governments could offset the distorting mark-up effect by paying a production or employment subsidy τ 
and finance the latter by levying a lump-sum tax. In case of τ=μ-1, the subsidy would exactly offset the 
mark-up distortion and ensure steady-state production to equal the efficient output under perfect competi-
tion. However, practical feasibility of implementing such a subsidy scheme is doubtful (e.g. Benigno and 
Woodford 2005). 
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while the price dispersion term in equation (18) evolves according to 
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Given that technology and inputs are identical across firms, Ph,t=PH,t holds in case of perfectly 
flexible prices.
5
 
2.2 The rest of the world 
The rest of the world is unaffected by household and firm behaviour in the small economy, but 
influences the latter via trade and capital flows. We capture the rest of the world with a simple 
closed-economy framework. Household utility and welfare are assumed to correspond to equa-
tions (1) and (2) respectively. Foreign households face a budget constraint that is equivalent to (3) 
and where the dividends also include income from oil extraction. This setting gives first order 
conditions for consumption and labour supply that correspond to (4) and (5). Equating the domes-
tic and world Euler equations yields 
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where the asterisks denote variables in the rest of the world, and where S is the nominal exchange 
rate. If capital markets are perfectly integrated and risk is perfectly diversified, the expectation 
term on the right hand side reduces to a constant δ, reflecting the relative wealth of the representa-
tive foreign and domestic households. In this case, we obtain the relationship     
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 If a subsidy τ=μ-1 was in place, the flexprice level of production would also equal the level of efficient 
output. 
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between foreign and domestic levels of consumption.
6
 Assuming equal endowments of domestic 
and foreign households gives δ=1.  
 The representative foreign household consumes a bundle of manufactured goods and oil 
that both enter a CES consumption utility function 
            (27) 
equivalent to equation (7). Consequently, we also obtain analogous demand functions for non-oil 
and oil final demand 
              (28) 
.               (29) 
Furthermore the law of one price is assumed to hold across countries, implying PF,t=StPM,t
*
. Ex-
ports from the small economy to the rest of the world then equal   
.              (30) 
While it is substantial from the small country perspective, the trade volume is too small to affect 
real wages and the demand for non-oil production in the rest of the world. Entirely driven by for-
eign pricing decisions, the CPI of the rest of the world reads   
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Aggregate world non-oil output equals world demand for non-oil manufactured goods 
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 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) or Galí and Monacelli (2005) for a detailed derivation of (1.26) under 
perfect international risk sharing.   
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**
tt MY  .                (32) 
For simplification, we consider oil as a commodity that has no extraction costs, but a market 
price, and thus generates a rent. The production of non-oil consumer goods, on the other hand, 
uses the same technology as production in the small country. To focus on the impact of nominal 
and real rigidities in the small economy and on their interaction, we furthermore assume prices 
and wages to be perfectly flexible in the rest of the world across all simulation scenarios. Price 
flexibility implies the absence of price dispersion (25), so that overall production equals     
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The optimal combination of inputs depends on relative factor prices. Analogously to (19), optimi-
sation yields  
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as the cost-minimising factor mix. Real marginal production costs amount to  
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Firms sell their products under monopolistic competition and set prices with a mark-up over 
nominal marginal costs. Given fully flexible prices, price setting reduces to a static optimisation 
problem. Equation (23) therefore simplifies to 
*
1
1 tMC
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for the rest of the world and implies constant real marginal costs in non-oil production.     
 The relative world-market price for oil is exogenously given. It is modelled as an AR (1) 
process 
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,             (37) 
where 0≤ρO≤1 measures relative price persistence and εO is the stochastic disturbance. Rising 
relative oil prices increase production costs and lower the real wage, which reduces both aggre-
gate supply and total consumption. The impact on the demand for non-oil goods depends on the 
elasticity of substitution between oil and non-oil goods in the CES functions (7) and (27). The 
volume of non-oil consumption increases under a high, but declines under a low price elasticity of 
the consumer demand for oil. Note that a temporary shock to the relative price of oil implies a 
return of relative prices to steady state, but does not require a return of absolute prices to their 
initial levels.     
3. Optimal monetary policy          
Ramsey monetary policy, i.e. optimal monetary policy under commitment, derives from an infi-
nite-horizon Lagrangian problem, in which the central bank maximises conditional expected so-
cial welfare (1) subject to the full set of constraints that derive from the private sector’s behav-
ioural equations and from the market-clearing conditions of the economy (e.g. Khan et al. 2003, 
Levin et al. 2005). The first-order conditions follow from differentiating the Lagrangian with re-
spect to each variable that is endogenous to monetary policy and from setting these derivatives to 
zero. We rely on the Levin et al. (2005) procedure to compute the first-order conditions and then 
analyse the behaviour of the economy under optimal policy by combining the first-order condi-
tions with the behavioural equations of the private sector and the market clearing conditions. In 
this setup, the central bank’s first-order conditions take the place of a single interest rate rule. The 
Ramsey policy ensures optimal stabilisation under the set of exogenous shocks considered and 
therefore yields the highest possible level of welfare given structural frictions and inefficiencies 
in the economy. 
tO
tC
tO
O
tC
tO
P
P
P
P
,*
1,
*
1,
*
,
*
,
lnln  



















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 Approximating the optimal Ramsey solution with a simple interest rate rule would also 
be interesting, not least because it would allow investigating which inflation measure central 
banks should target under relative price disturbances such as oil price shocks (see e.g. Bodenstein 
et al. 2007, De Fiore et al. 2006, Dhawan and Jeske 2007, Kamps and Pierdzioch 2002). How-
ever, the present paper has a narrower focus on the monetary policy and welfare consequences of 
real rigidities and their interactions with nominal ones under oil price – and, more broadly, cost-
push – shocks.      
4. Simulation scenarios and calibration         
We first study impulse responses and carry out welfare analysis for combinations of two different 
degrees of nominal and real rigidities. We choose Calvo parameter values of ξ=0.5 and ξ=0.8 for 
low and high nominal rigidity respectively, which correspond to average price durations of 2 and 
5 quarters, and are in line with the empirical findings in Bils and Klenow (2004) and Altissimo et 
al. (2006) about average price adjustment frequencies in the US and the euro area. Low and high 
real wage rigidity corresponds in the wage equation (6) to ρw=0.79 and ρw=0.93, respectively. The 
two alternative values imply half-lives of deviations of the real wage from its equilibrium level of 
about 3 quarters and 3 years, respectively, and match the lower and the higher bounds of esti-
mated real wage rigidity in euro area countries (1980-2005) in Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007).  
 The simulations account for the inefficiency of the steady state under monopolistic com-
petition. The elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods is set to μ=6 in the baseline sce-
nario, which generates a steady-state price mark-up of 20%, and to μ=21 in an alternative sce-
nario, which is close to the value in Leduc and Sill (2006), decreases the mark-up to only 5% and 
therefore substantially reduces the inefficiency from monopolistic competition.
7
 In addition, an 
                                                     
7
 As mentioned in section 3 introducing a production subsidy that lowers or exactly offsets the inefficiency 
associated with monopolistic competition would constitute an alternative (see e.g. Woodford 2003). In ad-
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analysis of the welfare effects of interactions between nominal and real rigidities in Section 5 is 
carried out within the parameter space of ξ=0.5-0.8 for nominal and ρw=0.75-0.93 for real rigidity 
and grid intervals of 0.05. All calculations of first and second moments and the welfare compari-
son rely on a second-order approximation of the model in Dynare 4.
8
  
 The calibration of the remaining parameters adopts standard choices from the literature 
and is summarised in Table 1. It assumes logarithmic consumption utility, i.e. unit intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, and unit elasticity of substitution between imports and exports of manu-
factured goods. The elasticity of labour supply of 0.4 equals the value in De Fiore et al. (2006). 
The share of oil in the consumption basket is set equal to 7% and lies in between the euro area 
(4.5%) and US (8.5%) calibration of the consumption share of fuel and gas in De Fiore et al. 
(2006), with a low elasticity of substitution of 0.09 between oil and manufactured goods. The in-
put share of oil in the production function is 2.5% (see Backus and Crucini 2000, De Fiore et al. 
2006), which is slightly higher than the 2% in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006). As in the latter, the 
elasticity of substitution between oil and labour in production is set to 0.59. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Oil prices are modelled as a temporary but highly persistent shock to the relative price of oil in 
the world market (37), with a persistence parameter ρO=0.95. Impulse responses are based on an 
initial doubling of the relative price of oil, which for the log-linear formulation (37) implies 
                                                                                                                                                              
dition to the questionable realism of a lump-sum financed production subsidy, comparison between two 
distinct values for the elasticity of substitution also allows interpreting the results as comparing different 
degrees of product market competition.     
8
 Kim and Kim (2003, 2007) show that welfare evaluation combining a second-order approximation of util-
ity with first-order approximations of the model equations is inaccurate around a distorted steady state. 
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εt=0.69. As we treat oil as the only commodity and calibrate it to the share of fuel and gas in the 
CPI and in production, the oil shock may also be seen as a shortcut for a global commodity price 
shock.  
5. Results         
We now analyse the effects of real wage rigidity and its interaction with price stickiness within the 
calibrated model in the presence of global oil price shocks and under optimal monetary commit-
ment. Table 2 reports the first and second moments for output, the output gap
9
, inflation and the 
nominal interest rate for the two alternative degrees of steady-state distortion – i.e. the 20% (μ=6) 
and 5% (μ=21) price mark-ups, respectively – and six possible combinations of nominal and real 
rigidities. 
Table 2 about here 
 
Regardless of the degree of nominal inertia, the volatility of log output, the output gap, GDP price 
inflation and the nominal interest rate are found to rise with the degree of real wage rigidity. 
However, for a given degree of non-zero real wage rigidity, higher nominal inertia reduces fluc-
tuations in these variables. These findings hold for both values of the steady state distortion. 
Whatever the combination of nominal and real rigidities, a larger steady-state distortion always 
coincides with higher inflation volatility. Table 2 also gives the mean values for log output, the 
output gap, inflation and the nominal interest rate under the different combinations of the rigidity 
                                                     
9
 Blanchard and Galí (2007a) refer to this variable as the welfare-relevant output gap. It measures the log 
difference between actual output and production under fully flexible prices and wages. Thus, the latter 
measure of potential production displays the optimal unconstrained behaviour of household and firms in 
reaction to the exogenous shock.     
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parameters.
10
 While mean output decreases in the degree of both nominal and real inertia, mean 
inflation increases with real wage rigidity but decrease with nominal stickiness. The fall of aver-
age GDP price inflation under lower frequencies of price adjustment reduces the distortionary 
impact of the shock on consumer choices.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The impulse responses in Figure 1 further illustrate the findings on macroeconomic volatility un-
der different degrees of nominal and real rigidities derived from Table 2. This chart plots nominal 
interest rates, int, real interest rates, rint, CPI and GDP price inflation, pi_cpi and pi_gdp, the out-
put gap, y_gap, log output, y, log consumption, c, log employment, n, and the log relative oil 
price on world markets, poc_row, in deviations from steady-state levels. Real rigidities essentially 
lengthen the time needed for the economy to return to its steady-state, while the degree of price 
rigidity primarily affects the initial amplitude of impulse responses. For a given degree of real 
wage rigidity, more flexible prices amplify initial peaks, although such peaks quickly decay in 
case of low real persistence. 
 Figure 1 suggests an important role for the nominal-real rigidity interaction in shaping 
interest rate, output and inflation responses to oil-price shocks and cost-push shocks more 
broadly. Instead of reinforcing the effect of real wage persistence, sticky prices dampen the infla-
                                                     
10
 Unlike under first-order approximation, the mean values from second-order approximation differ from 
the deterministic steady state in a stochastic environment. The deterministic steady state characterises the 
equilibrium in the absence of shocks and ignoring future shocks. The stochastic steady state, on the other 
hand, denotes the equilibrium in the absence of shocks, but taking into account the likelihood of future 
shocks. Given their impact on shock propagation and welfare, the degrees of both nominal and real rigidi-
ties affect the stochastic means.   
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tion and output response to shocks, for a given level of real rigidity. Prices flexibility reduces the 
sacrifice ratio, i.e. the output loss required to bring down inflation, but it also increases the sensi-
tivity of inflation to production costs. Consequently, flexible prices amplify the initial inflation 
response to oil price shocks. In a context where real wages respond little to the decline in output 
and labour demand, higher initial inflation pushes up the nominal wage, thereby reinforcing infla-
tionary pressures. In this context, the monetary authority concerned about inflation and the asso-
ciated inefficiency reacts more strongly and engineers a larger output contraction. By contrast, 
higher nominal price rigidity dampens initial inflationary pressures and improves both inflation 
and output stabilisation, for a given degree of real rigidity. In other words, when real rigidities are 
present in the economy, price stickiness dampens the initial goods price response to cost-push 
shocks and mitigates the second-round effect from nominal wages on production costs. 
 The implications for household welfare, studied in Table 3, are unambiguous. First, re-
gardless of the steady-state inefficiency and the degree of price stickiness, the loss strongly in-
creases in the degree of real rigidity. For example, under a 20% steady-state mark-up (=6) and a 
low degree of price stickiness (ξ = 0.5), the loss compared with the fully flexible economy is 
about 1.7% of steady-state consumption if real wage rigidity is high (ρw = 0.93) versus only 0.3% 
if it is moderate (ρw = 0.79). Second, and most interestingly, higher nominal rigidity reduces the 
welfare loss for a given degree of real rigidity. For example, under a 20% steady-state mark-up 
(=6) and a high degree of real wage rigidity (ρw = 0.93), the loss compared with the fully flexible 
economy is about 1.7% of steady-state consumption if price stickiness is low (ξ = 0.5) versus 
only 0.9% if it is high (ξ = 0.8). It is also worth noting that losses vary inversely with the price 
mark-up. The closer the distorted equilibrium is to the efficient steady state, the stronger the am-
plitude of output and inflation responses (see also Figure 1). 
 
Table 3 about here 
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It should be stressed that this pattern of welfare effects is a general finding that does not hinge on 
the particular choice of nominal and real rigidity parameters featured in Table 3. As an illustra-
tion, Figure 2 plots the welfare loss relative to the fully flexible economy (expressed as a percent-
age of steady-state consumption) across the parameter space ξ=0.50-0.80 and ρw=0.75-0.95, with 
grid intervals of 0.05, for a 20% steady-state mark-up distortion (μ=6). The surface shows the loss 
to increase monotonically in the degree of real rigidity, but to decrease in the degree of price 
stickiness for a given degree of real rigidity. While losses are generally more sensitive to real than 
to nominal inertia, the importance of price stickiness increases with the degree real wage rigidity. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
6. Conclusion        
This paper explores the welfare effects of real wage rigidities and their interaction with price 
stickiness, two issues which somewhat surprisingly have surfaced only recently in the New-
Keynesian literature. To this end, we focus on a major cost-push shock, namely an oil shock, and 
build up a new small open economy DSGE model where oil is used both as a production input 
and as a final consumption good. Impulse responses to a persistent oil price shock are then pre-
sented, and welfare analysis undertaken, for a plausible set of nominal and real rigidity parame-
ters based on values found in recent empirical analyses for European countries and the US. We 
find that under oil – and, more broadly, cost-push – shocks, the welfare cost of real rigidities can 
be very large, up to 2.5% of steady state consumption under high but yet plausible parameter val-
ues. Most interestingly, in a typical “tale of the second best”, higher nominal inertia is found to be 
welfare-enhancing in the presence of real wage rigidities, as it dampens the initial consumer 
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goods price response and mitigates the second-round effects from nominal wages on production 
costs. 
 From a theoretical perspective, these findings confirm Blanchard and Galí (2007a) and 
suggest that monetary economists should pay greater attention to real rigidities than they have 
done in the recent past. From a policy perspective, it appears that in the presence of cost-push 
shocks and real wage rigidities, reducing price stickiness is not welfare-enhancing. In particular, 
in most of Continental Europe, greater product market competition advocated by central bankers 
would not actually help the conduct of monetary policy under cost-push shocks, unless real wage 
rigidities are addressed first through labour market reforms.         
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Parameter Symbol Value 
Discount rate β 0.99 
Elasticity of labour supply φ
-
¹ 0.40 
Steady-state trade openness in manufactured goods α 0.30 
Steady-state consumption share of oil γ 0.07 
Substitution elasticity between oil and non-oil goods ε 0.09 
Steady-state input share of oil θ 0.02 
Substitution elasticity between oil and labour  0.59 
Substitution elasticity between non-oil types of goods μ 6; 21 
Nominal price inertia ξ 0.50-0.80 
Real wage inertia ρw 0.75-0.95 
Persistence of oil shock ρO 0.95 
Standard deviation of oil shock σε 0.69 
Table 1: The model calibration 
 Rigidities Mean Standard deviation 
μ ρw ξ y y_gap πCPI πGDP i y y_gap πCPI πGDP i 
6 0.00 0.50 -0.1324 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0099 0.0898 0.0012 0.0554 0.0021 0.0039 
6 0.00 0.80 -0.1326 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0098 0.0878 0.0058 0.0562 0.0015 0.0056 
6 0.79 0.50 -0.1337 -0.0014 0.0021 0.0021 0.0121 0.1052 0.0363 0.0567 0.0148 0.0088 
6 0.79 0.80 -0.1341 -0.0017 0.0007 0.0007 0.0106 0.0952 0.0178 0.0543 0.0047 0.0032 
6 0.93 0.50 -0.1390 -0.0066 0.0087 0.0087 0.0187 0.1489 0.0907 0.0637 0.0314 0.0124 
6 0.93 0.80 -0.1393 -0.0069 0.0029 0.0029 0.0129 0.1211 0.0539 0.0536 0.0098 0.0044 
21 0.00 0.50 -0.0902 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0099 0.0875 0.0005 0.0538 0.0008 0.0035 
21 0.00 0.80 -0.0903 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0098 0.0865 0.0033 0.0547 0.0007 0.0050 
21 0.79 0.50 -0.0914 -0.0012 0.0018 0.0018 0.0118 0.1065 0.0433 0.0466 0.0077 0.0185 
21 0.79 0.80 -0.0921 -0.0019 0.0008 0.0008 0.0108 0.0972 0.0259 0.0500 0.0028 0.0063 
21 0.93 0.50 -0.0964 -0.0062 0.0077 0.0077 0.0173 0.1570 0.1040 0.0448 0.0168 0.0231 
21 0.93 0.80 -0.0986 -0.0084 0.0033 0.0033 0.0134 0.1312 0.0702 0.0468 0.0060 0.0102 
Table 2: Means and standard deviations for different combinations of nominal and real rigidities  
 Rigidities Welfare loss relative to the economy with flexible prices and wages 
 ρw ξ Value % of steady-state consumption 
6 0.00 0.50 0.0   0.0 
6 0.00 0.80 0.0 0.0 
6 0.79 0.50 -0.3 0.3 
6 0.79 0.80 -0.1 0.1 
6 0.93 0.50 -1.7 1.7 
6 0.93 0.80 -0.9 0.9 
21 0.00 0.50 0.0 0.0 
21 0.00 0.80 0.0 0.0 
21 0.79 0.50 -0.5 0.5 
21 0.79 0.80 -0.3 0.3 
21 0.93 0.50 -2.4 2.4 
21 0.93 0.80 -1.5 1.5 
Table 3: Means and standard deviations for different combinations of nominal and real rigidities 
  24 
 
 
Figure 1: Impulse responses to the oil price shock under different degrees of nominal and real rigidities 
ξ=0.5 & ρw=0.79 ξ=0.5 & ρw=0.93 ξ=0.8 & ρw=0.79 ξ=0.8 & ρw=0.93
A. Steady state with μ=6 (20% price mark-up)
B. Steady state with μ=21 (5% price mark-up)
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Figure 2: Welfare losses across a grid of nominal and real rigidity values 
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
W
e
lf
a
re
 c
o
s
t 
o
f 
ri
g
id
it
ie
s
 i
n
 %
 o
f 
s
te
a
d
y
 s
ta
te
 c
o
n
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
Calvo parameter Real wage rigidity
